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The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's Proposed
Information Disclosure Statement Rules:
Too Novel and Nonobvious 1
RUSSELL S. MAGAZINER*
INTRODUCTION

"[D]ramatic and complex" 2 change is in the air at the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO or "the Office"). Currently, the PTO is swamped. In fiscal
year 2006, the Office received a record 440,000 patent applications, but examiners
only completed 332,000. 3 In an effort to increase efficiency and cut costs, the Office
has proposed at least four major patenting procedural changes. And, to put it mildly,
much of the world outside of the PTO is not pleased with the proposals. 5 The purpose

1. Aside from their common, intuitive meanings, the terms "novel" and "nonobvious" are
key statutory standards of patentability. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03 (2006). They encapsulate the
heart of my argument: while novelty and nonobviousness are essential to inventions, stark
departures from the customary administrative rules will have dreadful side effects on the U.S.
patenting system.
* Managing Editor, Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 83; J.D. Candidate 2008, Indiana
University School of Law-Bloomington; M.S. 2002, Air Force Institute of Technology, WrightPatterson Air Force Base; B.S. 2000, United States Air Force Academy. I am sincerely grateful
to my wife, family, and friends for their encouragement. Also, I appreciate the advice and
attention of Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington Professor Kevin E. Collins.
2. Letter from Michael K. Kirk, Executive Dir. of the Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n,
to Jon W. Dudas, Under Sec'y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop. and Dir. of the U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office 1 (Sept. 6, 2006) (http:llwww.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/oplal
comments/ab95/aipla.pdf) [hereinafter AIPLA letter]. See generally U. S. PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2006,

availableat http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2006/2006annualreport.pdf.
3. Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Fiscal 2006: A Record-Breaking Year
for the USPTO (Dec. 22, 2006) (http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/comlspeeches/06-73.htm)
[hereinafter Record-Breaking Year].
4. See Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related
Materials, 71 Fed. Reg. 38,808 (July 10, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1); Changes to
Practice for Petitions in Patent Applications to Make Special and for Accelerated Examination,
71 Fed. Reg. 36,323 (June 26, 2006); Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications,
Requests for Continued Examination Practice, and Applications Containing Patentably
Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed. Reg. 48 (Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1); Changes to
Practice for the Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 71 Fed. Reg. 61 (Jan. 3, 2006)
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
5. For example, see the many public "comments" that have been posted on the PTO Web
site, submitted in response to the various proposed changes. See U. S. Patent and Trademark
Office, Comments on Changes, http://www.uspto.gov/web/officeslpac/dapp/oplal
comments/ab95/ids.htm [hereinafter Comments from Public]; U. S. Patent and Trademark
Office, Comments Regarding Claims Practice, http://www.uspto.gov/web/officesl
pac/dapp/opla/comments/fpp-claims/claimscomments.html [hereinafter Claims Comments];
U. S. Patent and Trademark Office, Comments Regarding Continuation Practice,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/fppscontinuation
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of this Note is to focus analysis on one of the four-the PTO's proposed rule changes
to the Information Disclosure Statement (IDS) in patent applications. While somewhat
lesser-publicized than the proposed changes to "continuing applications," 6 PTO
implementation of this prospective set of new IDS regulations would greatly impact
the daily practice of patent attorneys and applicants. 7
The status quo IDS system has its drawbacks. Currently, an applicant has the duty
to disclose certain known information to the PTO. Information that an examiner would
find relevant for evaluation of the patent application must be submitted to the PTO in
an IDS. 8 However, some applicants have been submitting too much information for the
examiners to efficiently handle. 9 Also, information is often inconveniently disclosed to
the PTO well after the examiners have concluded their own search for relevant
references. 1 If IDS submissions arrive too late, examiners will often wastefully
duplicate applicants' search efforts and experience.
The proposed rules are meant to alleviate these problems." They are intended to
"encourage" 12 submission of timely and concise IDSs under the threat of extensive
additional disclosure requirements. 13 The number of patent applicants potentially
impacted is enormous. According to PTO estimates, at least 66,000 applications in
fiscal year 2006 would have automatically triggered mandatory additional disclosures
under the new rules, requiring formal, written explanations for each of their cited IDS
documents. 14
A flaw in the PTO's plan is that the PTO is enlisting the proverbial fox to guard the
henhouse. 15 As rationalized by the PTO, applicants would now be required to filter out
"irrelevant information" from their own IDS submissions so that PTO examiners could
"be able to focus upon the more relevant information, and perform a more efficient,
effective examination." 16 Not only would applicants be required to disclose all known
continuationcomments.html [hereinafter Continuation Comments].
6. Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for Continued Examination
Practice, and Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed. Reg. at 48. See
Claims Comments, supra note 5.
7. See Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related
Materials, 71 Fed. Reg. at 38,808.
8. Duty to Disclose Information Material to Patentability, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2000).
9. See Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related
Materials, 71 Fed. Reg. at 38,809.
10. Id.

11. See id. at 38,808.
12. Id. at 38,808-09.
13. See id. at 38,810.
14. The PTO estimates that "approximately" fifteen percent of submitted IDSs contain over
twenty documents. See Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other
Related Materials, 71 Fed. Reg. at 38,810. There were 440,000 applications submitted in fiscal
year 2006. Record-Breaking Year, supra note 3. The "at least" precedes the 66,000 number
because passing the twenty documents triggering threshold is just one of the several ways that
mandatory "explanations" for all documents are required under the new rules. See Changes to
Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related Materials, 71 Fed. Reg. at
38,810.
15. This idiom was often used by retired Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington
Professor Roger Dworkin in his lectures to comically express a serious conflict of interest
problem.
16. Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related
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references potentially damaging to the patentability 17 of their claims,' 8 applicants may
soon be expected to screen their own knowledge and independent background search
findings for the most damaging information to their applications and then explain to
the PTO why the information is so damaging. 19These proposed IDS rules effectively
force applicants to be their own de facto examiners for a critical portion of the patent
prosecution process.
Sudden jumps in the burden of filing applications due to the triggering of additional
disclosure requirements under the proposed rules could cost companies millions 20 as
well as weaken the enforceability of future patents. 21 Resulting incentives will drive
patent applicants to intentionally remain ignorant regarding existing information
related to their inventive ideas.22 The logic underlying this rational ignorance is that by
not learning of a reference, the applicant does not discover the damaging information
therein, thus foreclosing any duty to disclose the reference to the PTO.23
Unfortunately, the cost for ignorance will be poorly written patents, as well as
uninformed decision making regarding whether or not to even proceed with the costly
patent application process. 24 Furthermore, even with attempts for the relative safety of
ignorance, circumstances completely out of applicants' control, such as previous
knowledge and experience, 25 could still automatically trigger new penalty-like
requirements.
The Patent Office needs to recognize the danger of being "too novel and
nonobvious" while creating administrative policy. When planning new rules affecting
the entire U.S. patent system, the PTO should be very careful not to upset aspects of
the system that are currently working well. Minor procedural differences early in the
patenting pipeline will have major impacts down the road-and the PTO's proposed

Materials, 71 Fed. Reg. at 38,809.
17. The term "patentability" refers broadly to the substantive requirements for an invention
to qualify for patent protection. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1158 (8th ed. 2004)
("patentability search"). See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (2006) (explaining utility,
novelty, and nonobviousness, respectively).
18. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2000).

19. See IDS Changes, supra note 4, at 38,810.
20. See, e.g., Letter from Bart Eppenauer, Chief Patent Counsel, Microsoft Corp., to Hiram
H. Bernstein, Comm'r for Patents, U. S. Patent and Trademark Office 6 (Sept. 8, 2006)
(http://www.uspto.gov/web/officesl pac/dapp/oplalcommentslab95/microsoft.pdf ) [hereinafter
Microsoft letter] (estimating that the cost to Microsoft for following the proposed IDS rules will
be an additional twenty to thirty million dollars).
21. See discussion infra Part II, explaining the resulting danger of increased inequitable
conduct allegations and a likely change in the applicability of 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2002), the
presumption of validity.
22. See generally Mark A. Lemley, RationalIgnorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L.

REv. 1495, 1497 n.6 (2001) ("The basic idea of rational ignorance is that any person will spend
only a certain amount of time or money to obtain a piece of information. If obtaining that
information costs more than the information is worth, an individual will (or should) rationally
choose to remain ignorant.").
23. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (requiring disclosure only of "known" information).
24. See discussion infra Part H, explaining the resulting costs of skipping patentability
searches.
25. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (omitting distinction between information uncovered during the
patent prosecution process and information previously known).
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IDS rules are far greater than "minor. 26 These rules would have costly side effects.27
While there may be short-term cost savings at the Office, 28 implementation of the
proposed rules would be a terrible mistake overall.
29
Many in the legal community and in various sectors of industry are up in arms.
They argue that, in the case of the proposed IDS changes, the reforms should be kept
simple and the burden of prior art30 examination should stay with the PTO.
Fortunately, it is not too late for the PTO to amend its proposed plan. A large number
of helpful ideas have been presented to the PTO by concerned users of the patent
system. 3' For example, a much less abrasive solution would be to simply
adjust patent
32
billing rates to reflect the examination burdens of submitted IDSs.
The Part to follow brings the reader up to speed on the currently applicable law as
well as the proposed IDS rule changes. In Part II, the discussion turns to foreseeable
problems resulting from PTO implementation of the proposed IDS rules. However, the
purpose of this Note is not only to provide constructive feedback to the PTO and its
policymakers; it is also to assist the judiciary and the patenting public. Therefore, this
Note concludes in Part III with suggestions for the judiciary, useful coping tactics for
practitioners, and alternative administrative solutions.
I. MECHANICS OF THE

CURRENT SYSTEM AND THE PROPOSED CHANGES

Within the broader category of patent law are subcategories of patent prosecution
and patent litigation. Patent prosecution covers the process of bargaining for patent
rights with the Patent and Trademark Office. 33 Patent litigation involves the battle for
enforcement of patent rights in court. The two subcategories are inherently tied
together. For example, a patent's written prosecution history is often the subject of
later patent litigation arguments. Errors in the prosecution of a patent largely affect the
rights that the patent holder can later claim against an accused infringer. This Note
covers a potentially changing aspect early in the patent prosecution process, which will
likely have future prosecution and litigation ramifications. This Part presents the
current relevant law, followed by the proposed IDS rule changes.

26. See generally Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other
Related Materials, 71 Fed. Reg. 38,808 (July 10, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
27. See discussion infra Part II.
28. See Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related
Materials, 71 Fed. Reg. at 38,810.
29. See Comments from Public, supra note 5.
30. "Prior art" is a patenting term of art. "Art" in the patent context refers to a field of
endeavor. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY, supra note 17, at 118. "Prior art" includes public
knowledge, which can be in the form of publications, patents, public uses, and general common
knowledge, available by the critical date. See id. at 119. The "critical date" is the date of
invention for the purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (the novelty requirement) and one year
before the filing date for § 102(b) (the statutory bar). Thus, prior art is technical information
existing before the invention that is relevant for the evaluation of the patent claims.
31. See supra note 5.
32. See infra Part III for a thorough explanation of many of the more useful proposed
solutions.
33. See BLACK'S LAWDICrIONARY, supranote 17, at 1258 ("prosecution" fourth definition
entry).
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A. CurrentSystem
In order for the Office to effectively evaluate 34 patent applications, individuals
"associated with the filing and prosecution of the patent" 35 are required to act with
candor and good faith.3 6 Within this broad requirement is the duty of applicants to
disclose all known information that is material to the patentability of their
applications. 37 This first sub-Part clarifies the extent of a patent applicant's duty to
disclose potentially damaging information, with respect to the application's claims, to
the PTO; how to distinguish which information must be disclosed; and the way in
which disclosed information is to be delivered to the PTO. Subsequently, this sub-Part
presents the doctrine of inequitable conduct, a patent litigation defense which can stem
from a breach of the duty to disclose during patent prosecution.
One of the earliest steps in the patenting process is a patentability search. There is
no legal requirement that a patent applicant make such a search 38 to see if the inventive
idea is already in the realm of prior art. However, conducting a search for relevant
prior art can be helpful when drafting a patent application in at least two important
ways. Firstly, it is inefficient to write claims without knowing if the claims are written
too broadly and invalidated by previously existing technology. 39 Knowledge of
existing prior art helps a drafter to know where the broadest claim boundaries may
lie. 4° Secondly, the rest of the patent prosecution process can be quite expensive.4

34. See Duty to Disclose Information Material to Patentability, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2000)
(presenting the underlying policy goals for the duty).
35. Id. § 1.56(c)(1)-(2). See RONALD B. HILDRETH, A PRACTTONER's GUIDE: PATENT LAW §
20:5 (3d ed. 2006); MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2001.01 (Magdalen Y. C.
Greenliefed., 8th ed., rev. 5 2006) [hereinafter MANUAL] ("Individuals having a duty to disclose
are limited to those who are substantially involved in the preparation or prosecution of the
application," which includes the patent attorney or agent and the inventor(s), but excludes
typists, clerks, and other assisting personnel.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. See Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1995); 37 C.F.R. § 1.56; Todd
M. Becker, Note & Comment, Attorney-Client Privilege Versus the PTO's Duty of Candor:
Resolving the Clash in Simultaneous Patent Representations,71 WASH. L. REv. 1035 (1996).
37. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a).
38. See Frazier v. Roessel Cine Photo Tech, Inc., 417 F.3d 1230, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
("[A]s a general rule, there is no duty to conduct a prior art search, and thus there is no duty to
disclose art of which an applicant could have been aware." (quoting FMC Corp. v. Hennessey
Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 526 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1987))); MANUAL, supra note 35, § 609.
39. See ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON THE MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING (5th ed.

2003).
40. See Frank A. DeLucia & Carl B. Wischhusen, Patent Specification Drafting, in
FUNDAMENTALS OF PATENT PROSECUTION 2006: A BOOT CAMP FOR CLAIM DRAFTING &
AMENDMENT WRITING 69-105 (2006); Robert C. Faber, Patent Claim Writing, in
FUNDAMENTALS OF PATENT PROSECUTION 2006: A BOOT CAMP FOR CLAIM DRAFTING &
AMENDMENT WRITING 125-45 (2006); Lock See Yu-Jahnes, An Introduction to Claim Drafting,
in FUNDAMENTALS OF PATENT PROSECUTION 2006: A BOOT CAMP FOR CLAIM DRAFTING &
AMENDMENT WRITING 107-23 (2006).

41. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 22, at 1498 (estimating the cost of prosecution to be
between $10,000 and $30,000 per patent in 2001); Patent Hawk, Prior Art Search,
http://www.patenthawk.com/search.htm(advertising a rate of $160 per hour for each patent
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Knowledge of the prior art gives an applicant a rough idea of the potential claim scope
early in the prosecution process, aiding in the decision of whether or not to go through
with the application filing.
Once a patentability search has begun, patent prosecutors must disclose certain
findings to the PTO.42 As statutorily defined in 37 C.F.R. §1.56, information must be
disclosed if it is "material to patentability" and is not cumulative to information already
of record with the PTO. 3 Information "material to patentability" either (1) establishes
a prima facie case of unpatentability, or (2) conflicts with a position taken by the patent
applicant when asserting an argument relevant to patentability.44 A breach of this duty
to disclose includes omissions of known material information, as well as affirmative
misrepresentations. 45
A prima facie case of unpatentability exists when a patent claim, given its broadest
reasonable meaning in light of the full application, compels the conclusion that the
claim is unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence. 46 Reasons for
unpatentability include a lack of the requisite novelty or nonobviousness when
considering the prior art.47 Furthermore, such a case for prima facie unpatentability can
be made by references acting either by themselves or in combination with other
references. 48 Thus, technically speaking, a reference may be "material 49to patentability"
even if it presents only a partial prima facie case for unpatentability.
Code of Federal Regulations § 1.56 is only a "starting point" for determining which
information is material to patentability.5 0 Case law clarifies that the scope of
information "material to patentability" is broader than the scope of information that
would actually invalidate a patent.5 ' In 1992, the older "reasonable examiner" standard
52
for materiality was clarified by the PTO's current 37 C.F.R. § 1.56, elucidated above.
However, the new rule "was not intended to constitute a significant substantive break"

search).
42. See Duty to Disclose Information Material to Patentability, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2000);
David Hricik, Aerial Boundaries: The Duty of Candor as a Limitation on the Duty of Patent
Practitionersto Advocate for Maximum Patent Coverage, 44 S.TEx. L. REv. 205 (2002).
43. The "not cumulative" requirement in the 1992 revision of § 1.56 codified the common
law position. See also Engel Indus. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
44. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b).
45. See Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1995); DONALD S.
CHISUM, CRAIG A. NARD, HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PAULINE NEWMAN & F. ScoTr KIEFF,
PRICIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1081 (1998).

46. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b).
47. See Conditions for Patentability; Novelty and Loss of Right to Patent, 35 U.S.C. § 102
(2002); Conditions for Patentability; Non-Obvious Subject Matter, 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2004).
48. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(1).
49. See, e.g., Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access Inc., 120F.3d 1253 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (ruling that a reference was material because it could potentially be used in
combination with other information in a nonobviousness rejection).
50. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
51. See Critikon, Inc., 120 F.3d at1255-59 (holding that the omitted information was
sufficiently material to render a patent unenforceable, but not invalid).
52. Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1314-16 (Fed. Cir.2006)
(explaining the current standard of "material to patentability"). See also Duty of Disclosure, 57
Fed. Reg. 2021 (Jan. 17, 1992) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 10) (revising the duty of
disclosure).
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in the standard.53 Therefore, applicants must disclose known information that a
"reasonable examiner" would want to consider when deciding whether a claimed
invention is patentable. 54
Information that falls within an applicant's duty to disclose should be submitted to
the PTO in an Information Disclosure Statement. 55 Each IDS should include a list and
copy of the relevant parts "of all patents, publications, applications, or other
information submitted for consideration" by the PTO.56 Sources of information
material to patentability include foreign or domestic patents and publications, as well
as known U.S. public uses, public knowledge, and sales of the claimed invention, or
embodiments that teach57 claimed aspects of the invention.5 s
Under the current rules, applicants can submit as many references as they deem
necessary, and there is no need to summarize or characterize English-language
sources. 59 Furthermore, information submitted within an IDS is not construed to be an
admission of materiality to patentability. 6 0 The underlying policy reasoning is that "[i]t
is in the best interest of the Office and the public to permit and encourage individuals
to cite information to the Office without fear of making an admission against [their
own] interest,,, 61 because applicants will be more inclined to disclose sources which
could be useful to examiners if the self-penalizing costs for disclosure are reduced.
Applicants can also submit
follow-up IDSs as new information surfaces without
62
admitting materiality.
As a reward to applicants for filing thorough and accurate IDSs, a legal presumption
of validity attaches to the resulting patents. 63 Furthermore, PTO examiners

53. Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(quoting Hoffman La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1366 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
54. See Digital ControlInc., 437 F.3d at 1315-16 (explaining that there are several tests for
what is material to patentability, but the reasonable examiner standard may be the broadest and
most useful); Critikon, Inc., 120 F.3d at 1257-59.
55. Cf MANUAL, supra note 35, § 2001.04 ("If the noncompliance [with §§ 1.97, 1.98] is
intentional ...
the applicant will have assumed the risk that the failure to submit the information
in a manner that will result in its being considered by the examiner may be held [by courts] to
be a violation [of the duty to disclose]."). See generally Filing of Information Disclosure
Statement, 37 C.F.R. § 1.97 (2007); Content of Information Disclosure Statement, 37 C.F.R. §
1.98 (2007).
56. 37 C.F.R. § 1.98(a)(1), (2).
57. "Teach" is a term of art, meaning both discloses and enables one of ordinary skill inthe
art to reproduce an element's function inthe context of the claimed application. See 35 U.S.C. §
112 (2006).
58. See Conditions for Patentability; Novelty and Loss of Right to Patent, 35 U.S.C. § 102
(2006); Conditions for Patentability; Non-Obvious Subject Matter, 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
59. A "concise explanation" of the relevance of sources not in English must also be
included. 37 C.F.R. § 1.98(a)(3).
60. 37 C.F.R. § 1.97(h).
61. Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2022 (Jan. 17, 1992) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pts. 1 & 10).
62. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.97-1.98; Ulead Sys., Inc. v. Lex Computer & Mgmt. Corp., 351
F.3d 1139 (Fed. Ci. 2003).
63. See Presumption of Validity; Defenses, 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) ("A patent shall be
presumed valid."). See generallyJay P. Kesan & Marc Banik, Patentsas Incomplete Contracts:
Aligning Incentivesfor R&D Investment with Incentives to Disclose PriorArt, 2 WASH. U. J.L.
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acknowledge and explicitly list on the issued patents the references that they
considered during the examination. 64 This acknowledgement on issued patents serves
as support to bolster a patent holder's position in later patent litigation because it
shows evidence that the patent was deemed valid over the listed prior art. Opponents
have the burden to disprove validity by clear and convincing evidence when arguing
over references disclosed during the patent prosecution. 65 However, the patent's
validity presumption does not extend with the same strength over prior art that was not
disclosed by the applicant. This newly discovered prior art is more damaging to a
patent's validity. 66 As a result, the IDS system facilitates prompt, uniform, and
complete submission of material information, with
certainty to applicants that the
67
submissions will be inspected by PTO examiners.
The PTO is burdened by but benefits from thorough applicant-sponsored
patentability searches and extensive applicant knowledge of the prior art through the
duty to disclose in an IDS. The burden to the PTO is that examiners are required to
evaluate each IDS reference, 68 which can be overwhelming with lengthy listings.
Furthermore, the current IDS rules do not require applicants to explain why the
references are included or even to admit that the references are material. 69 Therefore,
fixed funding and limited time can restrict the examiners' abilities to properly inspect
the IDS documents. Conversely, PTO efficiency is harmed both by too few and too
many disclosures. 70 Examiners benefit from thorough IDS lists of prior art by attaining
leads for their own patentability searches as well as references to support their
examination decisions.
While evidence of examiners signing off on prior art references is the "carrot," the
judicially created doctrine of inequitable conduct is the "stick" to ensure that the PTO
receives honest and accurate IDS submissions. 7' The inequitable conduct defense in
patent infringement suits is closely intertwined with the sufficiency of the applicant's
disclosure in the Information Disclosure Statement. Deficiencies in the IDS open the
door to inequitable conduct allegations.72 If it is shown that an applicant had breached
the duty to disclose with regard to just one claim, then all claims of an otherwise valid
&POL'Y 23, 26 n. 10 (2000) (proposing an improved patent system that does more than simply
impute a "general presumption of validity associated with every patent in 35 U.S.C. § 282," but
instead one in which "a court will not invalidate a patent based on disclosed prior art unless it is
convinced that no reasonable examiner would have allowed the patent in light of the disclosed
prior art").
64. MANUAL, supra note 35, § 609.06 ("A citation listed on [a standard IDS form] and
considered by the examiner will be printed on the patent."); id. § 609.01.
65. See, e.g., Beckson Marine, Inc. v. NFM, Inc., 292 F.3d 718, 725 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
66. See generally Connell v. Sears, Roebuck &Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
67. See generally MANUAL, supra note 35, § 609.
68. Filing of Information Disclosure Statement, 37 C.F.R. § 1.97(c), (d) (2000).
69. Id. § 1.97(h).
70. See Microsoft letter, supra note 20.
71. See generally Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
814-16 (1945) (setting forth the policy justifications for the inequitable conduct doctrine);
Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining
the history of the inequitable conduct doctrine).
72. See supra note 55. See, e.g., McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487
F.3d 897, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (setting forth a recent explanation of the inequitable conduct
doctrine and upsetting patent prosecutors everywhere).
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patent can be rendered unenforceable against an infringer. 73 Even the enforceability of
separate patents stemming from the same original applications may be affected.74 With
these dramatic consequences, it is not surprising that allegations of inequitable conduct
are common defensive tactics employed during infringement suits. 75 Any significant
changes to IDS rules will inevitably impact future use of the inequitable conduct
defense.
The determination of inequitable conduct consists of a two-prong test. The first
prong requires the presence of minimum threshold levels of materiality and intent. 76
The second prong involves a judicial balancing of the totality of circumstances.77
In the first-prong analysis, materiality is established in the same manner as
"material to patentability" is determined with regard to the duty to disclose.78
"Materiality" refers to a failure to disclose information "material to patentability" or
the submission of false material information. 79 Historically, suppression of information
has been as fraudulent as affirmative
misrepresentation. 80 In either case, the threshold
8
1
low.
level of materiality is
"Intent" refers to an applicant's intention to deceive the PTO.82 The level of actual
intent may be extremely low, especially when the materiality of the omission or

73. Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1255-59
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co. 759 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See
generallyHiLDRETH, supra note 35, at § 20:1.
74. See, e.g., Fox Indus., Inc. v. Structural Pres. Sys., Inc., 922 F.2d 801,803-04 (Fed. Cir.
1990). But see Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1330-32 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(holding that a divisional patent was not invalidated by a related patent stemming from the same
initial application).
75. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(quoting BurlingtonIndus., Inc., 849 F.2d at 1422); Letter from Marylee Jenkins, President of
the New York Intellectual Property Law Association, to the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
(Sept. 7, 2006) (http://www.uspto.gov/web/ offices/pac/dapp/oplalcomments/ab95/nyipla.pdf)
[hereinafter NYIPLA letter] ("Inequitable conduct is almost always an issue in patent litigation,
and many times the basis of a charge of inequitable conduct is the failure to cite a relevant
reference during prosecution.").
76. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants,Ltd., 863 F.2d at 872 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1988); cf FMC
Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415-16 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that the complete
absence of deceptive intent negates allegations of inequitable conduct without regard to the
materiality of an omission or commission).
77. J.P. Sevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559-60 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (two-part
test).
78. Duty to Disclose Information Material to Patentability, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2000).

79. Id.
80. 1 C. BRUCE HAMBURG,

PATENT FRAUD AND INEQUITABLE CONDUCT §

1.05, at 1-32 (2d

ed. 1981).

81. See Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms., Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1133 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
("[W]e stress that the [threshold] level of materiality is not especially high.").
82. PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315, 1318 (Fed. Cir.
2000); Elk Corp. of Dallas v. GAF Bldg. Materials Corp., 168 F.3d 28, 30 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867,872 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing
JP.Sevens & Co., 747 F.2d at 1559).
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misrepresentation is strong enough.8 3 For example, intentionally avoiding to read an
84
on-hand document containing material information satisfies the intent element. 85
Evidence of culpability is often circumstantial and does not require direct evidence.
Furthermore, even the absence of a credible explanation for an omission of known
information "material to patentability" allows a judge to infer deceptive intent. 86 Thus,
the bar for the culpability element is minimal as well.
Under the second prong of the inequitable conduct test, levels of materiality and
deceptive intent are to be weighed in the context of all relevant facts and circumstances
87
to determine if the patentee's conduct should render the patent unenforceable.
Factors that courts consider include the degree of materiality and magnitude of
circumstantial evidence. Within this balancing analysis, a high level of materiality can
offset a low level of intent, and visa versa, 8 resulting in a finding of inequitable
conduct.
Once inequitable conduct has been found, the decision is difficult to overturn.
Procedurally, the determination of materiality and deceptive intent are considered
issues of fact, equitable in nature, and thus do not entitle an accused applicant to ajury
trial. 89 Furthermore, district court decisions are not easily reversed when inequitable
conduct has been found. Determinations of inequitable conduct are reviewed by the
Federal Circuit under the abuse of discretion standard. 90 District court findings on
materiality and intent are subject to the clearly erroneous standard. 9 1
Often the benefits to defendants for alleging inequitable conduct--even on weak
grounds--outweigh the costs. Defendants alleging inequitable conduct can be subject
to sanctions only if the allegations are "so lacking in substance as to constitute a waste
of time and resource[s] .... 92 This threat of sanctions has proven a largely ineffective
deterrent, such that "the habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major
patent case has become an absolute plague." 93 Strategically speaking, inequitable

83. See, e.g., McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897,912 (Fed.
Cir. 2007); Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1181(Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Kingsdown
Med. Consultants,Ltd., 863 F.2d at 876).
84. Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
85. Frazier v. Roessel Cine Photo Tech, Inc., 417 F.3d 1230, 1235-36 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
86. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc., 394 F.3d at 1352, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding
sufficient deceptive intent for not disclosing knowledge of a prior art admittedly "similar in
design and function" to the claimed invention).
87. See Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998); LAWRENCE
M. SUNG & JEFF E. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW HANDBOOK: 2006-2007 EDION § 3:1 (2006).
88. See Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp. 925 F.2d 1435, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
89. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876-77 (Fed.
Cir. 1988).
90. GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Akron Polymer
Container Corp. v. Exxel Container, Inc., 148 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
91. FED. R. Crv. P. 52(a); Kingsdown Med. Consultants,Ltd., 863 F.2d at 872.
92. HILDRETH,supra note 35, at §20:2 (citing Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Mfg. Co., 221 F.3d 1318
(Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000).
93. Kingsdown Med. Consultants,Ltd., 863 F.2d at 876 n. 15 (quoting Burlington Indus.,
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conduct, based on undisclosed damaging prior art, may be a far better defense than
simply citing an invalidating reference. The reference alone may only invalidate some
of the patent's claims,94while willful omission by the applicant may make the entire
patent unenforceable.
To prevent allegations of inequitable conduct, patent prosecutors are encouraged to
err on the side of caution regarding IDS submissions. 95 Applicants are advised, that
"[w]hen in doubt, it is desirable and safest to submit information. Even though the
attorney, agent, or applicant doesn't consider it necessarily material, someone else may
see it differently ....[T]he question of relevancy in close cases, should be left to the
examiner and not the applicant." 96 Under the current system, therefore, the
default
97
position for applicants is to disclose references with borderline materiality.
From the PTO's perspective, the current system is inefficient. Too many patent
attorneys submit irrelevant references and submit references too late. 98 The result is
that the most relevant information is "obscured." 99 The PTO has proposed a solution.
B. PTO 's ProposedIDS Rules

With the goals of improving efficiency, promoting innovation, and enhancing the
quality of patents, the Patent and Trademark Office introduced a proposal on July 10,
2006, to change the rules pertaining to information disclosure statements. 100
The new
plan is to have IDS rules "encourage" applicants to provide the PTO with only the
most relevant information, and to do so quickly. 101
There are several facets of the new
plan, including additional disclosure requirements for so-called "explanations," "noncumulative descriptions," and "patentability justifications," each of which will be
discussed in turn. The proposed safe harbor provision will be presented subsequently.
As with the current 37 C.F.R. § 1.97, applicability of the proposed rule
requirements differs depending upon the time of IDS submission relative to the patent
application's position in the prosecution pipeline. 102 There are four sequential periods
to consider: (1) the first time period starts with the application filing and ends either by

Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
94. See HAMBURG, supra note 80, § 1.05.
95. See LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1076 (Fed. Cir.
1992); U.S. Indus. v. Norton Co., 210 USPQ 94, 107 (N.D.N.Y. 1980).
96. MANUAL, supra note 35, § 2004, 10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. See NYIPLA letter, supra note 75 ("The standards of relevance and materiality have
changed over the years, and a consequence of this has been a tendency on the part of patent
practitioners to avoid determining what is relevant and instead leave it up to an Examiner to
make that determination.").
98. See Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related
Materials, 71 Fed. Reg. 38,808, 38,809 (July 10, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
99. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Proposed Rule Changes to Focus the Patent Process in
the 21 st Century, http://www.uspto.gov/web/officeslpac/dapp/oplalpresentation/focuspp.html.

100. Id.
101. See Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related
Materials, 71 Fed. Reg. at 38,809.
102. Compare Filing of Information Disclosure Statement, 37 C.F.R. § 1.97 (2000), with

Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related Materials, 71
Fed. Reg. at 38,812.
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the first office action °3 or else three months after filing, whichever is sooner; (2) the
second period starts after the first period and ends with a PTO allowance notice; (3) the
third period ends with payment of the issuance fee; and (4) the fourth period concludes
with the end of prosecution. 104
During the first period, an additional "explanation" would be required for certain
"triggering references," which include: (1) documents over twenty-five pages in
length, (2) documents not written in English, and (3) all IDS documents submitted, if
the total number of documents filed exceeds the threshold number of twenty. 105 Each
"explanation" would specifically identify the features, showings, and teachings that
required the reference to be listed in the IDS, as well as the page and line numbers
where the specific material portions could be located. 106The explanation would also
include any "correlations" between IDS documents and information about the
invention written in the patent application.10 7
After the first period, the burden of additional disclosure requirements would
rapidly increase. On top of explanations required for IDS references, the proposed
rules demand the additional requirement of "non-cumulative descriptions."'' l0 This
feature would call for the applicant to distinguish new references from those that have
been previously placed on the record. Applicants must also specifically point out
which features, showings, and teachings are not cumulative and why they were deemed
9
For IDS references filed after the start of the third period,
important enough to cite. 10
are required; they provide "explanations,"
justifications"
additional "patentability
"non-cumulative descriptions," as well as reasons why the new IDS references do not
10
invalidate the application's "independent" invention claims.'
The PTO's proposed rules block several possible ways to minimize the burdens that
they impose. The various additional required explanations and non-cumulative
descriptions are required to be "meaningfully" different for each reference. "'1If they
appear to beproformaexplanations, the examiner will have the option not to consider
them. 112 Previously cited references must be re-clarified in new additional disclosures
to account for amendments made to claims." 3 And, in continuation patent applications,
sum total of
references cited in the original applications are counted toward the
4
"
threshold.
triggering
twenty-reference
the
to
regard
with
references

103. "Office action" refers to a formal communication between the examiner and patent
applicant, usually stating the reasons why the application was denied. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 17, at 1115 ("office action").
104. See Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related
Materials, 71 Fed. Reg. at 38,812.
105. There are some narrow exceptions to this requirement. See id. at 38,810.
106. Id. at 38,814.
107. Id. at 38,810-12.
108. Id. at 38,810.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 38,815.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 38,815, 38,821.
113. Seeid. at 38,821.
114. See id. at 38,808-23.
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A "safe harbor" "15 provision, to be added to 37 C.F.R. § 1.56, has been proposed as
well. 116 Applicants would be protected from allegations of breaching their duty to
disclose if they submit IDSs that are compliant with the new requirements and do so in
good faith. Good faith in this context has been defined as "making reasonable inquiry"
and having "a reasonable basis for the statement" made in the explanations, noncumulative descriptions, and patentability justifications.li1
In theory, disclosing references early and choosing to carefully disclose only the
most important, non-cumulative references could save patent applicants the most
time-assuming that triggering references can possibly be avoided. Unfortunately, in
reality, because of the influence of early decisions on the development of later patent
issues, the IDS situation is far more complicated than the PTO assumes.
II. SIDE EFFECTS FROM THE PTO's SOLUTION

The Patent Office's goals are noble, but the proposed rules effectively force
applicants to make inopportune decisions early in the patenting process, which will
resonate throughout the resulting patents' lives. The problem discussion to follow
covers the long-run harms of applicants adjusting their filing strategy to compensate
for the proposed IDS rules. This strategy will inevitably be influenced by
considerations of minimizing the monetary costs to applicants while maximizing the
quality and scope of the patent claims, as well as attempting to avoid adding written
prosecution8 history-a rich potential source for opponents' allegations of inequitable
conduct. "
The proposed IDS rules create sudden jumps in costs to applicants when the
triggering thresholds are passed. Cost discontinuities occur in two forms. Applicants
will have to pay the additional time and monetary costs to practitioners 19 for
producing viable and defendable "explanations," "non-cumulative descriptions," and
"patentability justifications" for the IDS references.1 20 Secondly, applicants will
receive the burden of additional public correspondence between applicants and the
2
PTO examiners--extra prosecution history that will stay with a patent's record. ' '

115. In general, a "safe harbor" refers to a "provision (as in a statute or regulation) that
affords protection from liability or penalty." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,sUpra note 17, at 1363
(second entry for "safe harbor").
116. Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related
Materials, 71 Fed. Reg. 38,808, 38,811-12 (July 10, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
117. Id. at 38,811, 38,820.
118. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas DiLenge, Vice President and Gen. Counsel, Biotech.

Indus. Ass'n, to John J. Doll, Comm'r for Patents, U.S. Patent &Trademark Office (Sept. 12,
2006) (http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/oplalcomments/ab95/bio.pdf)[hereinafter
BIO letter]; Letter from Stuart L. Watt, Vice President and Law and Intellectual Prop. Officer,
Amgen Inc., to John J. Doll, Comm'r for Patents, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Sept. 8,
2006)
(http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/ab95/amgen.pdf)
[hereinafter Amgen letter].
119. Alternatively, if applicants decide to prosecute pro se, there will still be the time costs.
120. Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related
Materials, 71 Fed. Reg. at 38,810-12.
121. See Letter from P. Martin Simpson, Jr., Univ. Counsel for the Univ. of Cal., to John J.
Doll, Comm'r for Patents, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Sept. 7, 2006)
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Undoubtedly, because of the discontinuity in costs, applicants will actively seek to not
trigger the additional disclosure requirements necessary for documents greater than
twenty-five pages in length; documents written in foreign languages; documents
discovered after the first IDS period; or all documents, if the total number of
documents is greater than twenty. 122
Consider, for example, the discontinuity in cost to the applicants if the twentyreference threshold is crossed. The resulting applicant burden could skyrocket from
providing zero explanations to providiing explanations for absolutely all references
disclosed in the IDS. 123 This twenty-reference threshold effectively limits the number
of prior art references that applicants will want to disclose. Unfortunately, the proposed
rules have zero influence over the scope of references existing in the world that an
applicant would have to disclose if known.
With triggering prior art available, enactment of the proposed rules and the
disclosure requirements leave three main options for applicants: (1) stop looking at the
prior art before the twenty-reference threshold is met and avoid viewing other
triggering references; 24 (2) conduct a thorough prior art search, but disclose fewer
known references in the IDS; or (3) conduct a thorough prior art search and provide
any triggered additional disclosure to the PTO (and public). For applicants, each choice
has serious downsides.
Many public comments submitted to the PTO regarding the proposed IDS changes
suggest that the proposed rules will lead applicants to the first option-an intentional
decrease in the thoroughness of applicant-sponsored patentability searches and
understanding of the prior art. The PTO wants to encourage applicants to conduct
patentability searches, narrow their findings to the most applicable references, and
submit those references in IDSs; but instead, applicants will choose to remain
intentionally uninformed. 125 To ensure sufficient ignorance, applicants will not opt to
first find a large pool of references and then siphon that group down to the best
seventeen or so. 126 Instead, prior art searches will be halted after the first seventeen-or(http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/oplalcomments/ab95/univ of-calif.pdf)
[hereinafter UCal letter].
122. Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related
Materials, 71 Fed. Reg. 38,808, 38,810-12 (July 10, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
123. See id. at 38,810.

124. See Letter from Thomas M. Spielbauer, Intellectual Prop. Counsel, 3M Innovative
Props Co., to Jon W. Dudas, Under Sec'y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop. &Dir. of the U.S.
Patent &Trademark Office 4 (Sept. 8, 2006) (http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/
comments/ab95/3m.pdf) [hereinafter 3M letter].
125. Letter from Greg H. Gardella, Chairman of the Intellectual Prop. Law Revisions

Comm., Minn. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n, to Jon W. Dudas, Under Sec'y of Commerce for
Intellectual Prop. & Dir. of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office 2 (Sept. 6, 2006),

(http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/oplalcomments/ab95/mipla.pdf).
126. I say "seventeen or so" because strategically speaking, it seems logical that applicants,
seeking to ensure that the total number of mandatory IDS citations will not exceed twenty,
would want to leave some non-triggering IDS reference slots open for unexpected findings of
prior art. For example, if a patent attorney finished her patentability search finding seventeen
total references, and her inventor-client subsequently found another three sources needing to be
disclosed, then the total number of sources would still not breach the triggering threshold of
twenty. This "seventeen or so" cutoff number is an estimate and could vary. The number would
be a function of the likelihood of unplanned prior art discoveries that would need to be
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so references are discovered that could possibly be considered non-cumulative and
"material to patentability." Siphoning down a larger pool to a smaller group of the
most "material" references would leave open the chance that there would be more than
twenty references that could be argued to meet the required duty-to-disclose standards.
However, instead of siphoning, with the ignorance approach the PTO will not get a
succinct IDS list of the most valuable references. Instead it will only receive a list of
the first seventeen-or-so that potentially meet the mandated-disclosure standards.
Unfortunately for applicants, the statutory standards are vague regarding which
prior art information that courts consider required to be disclosed. 127 To make matters
worse, the vital distinguishing standards of "not cumulative" and "material to
patentability" are fact-specific terms of art. The standard for "material to patentability"
only requires a low level of materiality to satisfy the threshold for inequitable conduct,
and opponents in litigation have the benefit of hindsight. 128 Furthermore, "unless the
documents are identical, the context of cumulative is subjective and open to the
varying views of the beholder."' 29 After meticulously combing references known to
the applicant, but not disclosed during prosecution, skilled attorneys in opposition to
the patent holder will be able to argue that aspects of practically any discarded
reference would have been material to a reasonable examiner. Therefore, to reduce the
potential for misconduct allegations, a new level of cautiousness will inhibit inventors'
use of prior art, including applicant-sponsored patentability searches.
The ignorance approach would be far less efficient for applicants than the status quo
under the current rules. With fewer, less material references, estimates of claim scope
30
and boundaries by claim drafters will have to be made from a narrower perspective. 1
Less informed decisions regarding whether to proceed with patenting will be made,
resulting in higher rates of error in planning decisions. Also, patent claims will be
written with less knowledge of the prior art. More patents will be found unpatentable

disclosed. For purposes of this Note, the inexact number of "seventeen or so" will be used to
illustrate the point that the strategically comfortable cutoff would likely be some number fewer
than twenty, even if the PTO allows up to twenty.
127. See discussion supra Part I.A.
128. See 3M letter, supra note 124, at 2.
129. Microsoft letter, supra note 20, at 5 ("[T]he Rule 56 'materiality' standard remains
uncertain and there is no definitive standard for the applicant or for the court for determining
what is non-cumulative.") (internal quotation omitted); see also Letter from Manny W.
Schecter, Assoc. Gen. Counsel of Intellectual Prop. Law, IBM Corp., to John J.Doll, Comm'r
for Patents, U.S. Patent & Trademark Offfice 4 (Sept. 8, 2006)
(http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/
dapp/opla/comments/ab95/ibm.pdf) [hereinafter IBM letter] (noting that "cumulative" is an
unclear standard); 3M letter, supra note 124, at 2 (noting that "cumulative" and "material" are
both terms of art).
130. Cf supra text accompanying notes 63-67 (explaining the applicants' incentives to pay
for optional patentability searches).
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upon the extremely rigorous examination of high-stakes patent 32
litigation.' 31There will
standing.'
patent
in
certainty
and
confidence
in
decrease
be a
The second and third options for dealing with patent applications where triggering
references are known provide footholds for litigation opponents employing the
inequitable conduct defense. 133 Upon finding a triggering reference, the applicant must
decide whether or not to fully disclose and meet the additional disclosure burdens.
However, with the inequitable conduct doctrine, patent prosecutors are damned if they
do and damned if they don't. For example, "[e]ach time an applicant submits only a
portion of a reference, a skilled attorney will imply in litigation that something
significant was omitted." 134 Conversely, "[e]ach explanation provided by an applicant
as required under the proposed rules will be challenged as being inadequate or in
error." 135 Finding triggering references will lead applicants to nasty outcomes either
way.
Those choosing the third option, thorough patentability searches with full additional
disclosures, will not necessarily be rewarded with the same presumption-of-validity
"carrot" provided under the current system. Section 282 of the Code' 36 will not be
changed, but under the proposed system, applicants satisfying the additional disclosure
requirements must specifically point to page and line numbers 137 within the cited IDS
references. Those particular aspects of the prior art will be examined closely, but will
the presumption of validity extend as strongly to the portions of the references not
pinpointed? It is at least foreseeable that under the proposed rules, courts will only find
narrow portions of cited references fully covered by the presumption of validity-as
opposed to the more general, blanket presumption of validity under the current system
that would have covered the whole of each reference cited in the IDS.
The threat of applicant impropriety under the proposed rules is a legitimate concern.
The new rules shift the screening portion of the "burden to examine" from examiners
without interest conflicts' 38 to interested parties.' 39 If triggering references are found,

131. See Letter from Susan Barbieri Montgomery, Chair, Am. Bar Assoc. Section of
Intellectual Prop. Law, to John J. Doll, Comm'r for Patents, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office 3
(Sept. 12,2006) (http://www.uspto.gov/web/officeslpac/dapp/opla/comments/ab95/aba ipl.pdf)
[hereinafter ABA letter]. Insufficient prior art search will lead to higher rates of invalidity or
unenforceability.
132. See BIO letter, supranote 118, at 5. The proposed IDS changes will negatively affect
patent confidence and certainty.
133. See ABA letter, supranote 131, at 3 ("[Tlhe proposed rules will expose Applicants to a
possible greater risk of having to defend charges of inequitable conduct .. ").The proposed
rules would result in frequent unfounded allegations of inequitable conduct. See 3M letter,
supra note 124, at 4. There are costs to applicants in the form of both inequitable conduct and
prosecution history with the proposed rules. See UCal letter, supra note 121, at I.
134. Amgen letter, supra note 118, at 2 ("[P]atent applications related to biotechnology
inventions frequently involve IDS submissions of substantially more than twenty
references .....
135. Id.
136. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2002).
137. Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related
Materials, 71 Fed. Reg. 38,808, 38,814 (July 10, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
138. See IBM letter, supra note 129. Examiners have less of a conflict of interest than
applicants.
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the new rules create ethical conflicts for patent attorneys, "requiring them to take
positions potentially adverse to their clients' interests ..... ,,40 The regulation stating
that IDS references are not an admission of materiality would be undermined because
applicants would be required to explain the materiality of the references that they
submit.141 This divergence of Office and practitioner incentives will fuel stonewalling
and hurt candor. 142 Thus the proposed IDS rules directly undercut the current policy
meant to mitigate patent attorney conflicted interests.
The burden to deal with triggered additional disclosure requirements would fall
disproportionately on the shoulders of knowledgeable inventors and those in the fields
of highly published arts. From the start, patent applicants with differing knowledge and
experience would not be treated the same because the duty to disclose does not
distinguish between sources found in a patentability search and those already
known. 43 Knowledgeable patent applicants would be at an inherent disadvantage
because their preexisting knowledge of prior art would more likely include triggering
references than the preexisting knowledge of more naive applicants. 144 Furthermore,
certain technology fields have more publications than others, resulting in a higher
volume of relevant information "material to patentability." The biotech industry, for
example, is especially concerned about the ramifications of the proposed rules for this
reason. 145 Searchers in "hot" fields would reach the twenty-reference threshold at a
faster rate than searchers in less densely populated fields of art.
Perhaps as a way of compensating applicants for the increased burdens of the
proposed IDS rules, the PTO has also proposed the safe harbor provision.146 As
explained above, to achieve safe harbor applicants must act in good faith and comply
with the proposed rules. However, this proposed safe harbor does not actually add any
new protection, 147 Proof of applicants acting in "good faith" alone would currently be
sufficient safety, because the inequitable conduct defense requires deceptive intent. '48

139. See Letter from Mark G.Bocchetti, Dir. of the Patent Legal Staff, Eastman Kodak Co.,
to John J. Doll, Comm'r for Patents, U.S. Patent & Trademark Offfice 1-2 (Sept. 8, 2006)
(http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/oplalcomments/ab95/kodak.pdf)
[hereinafter
Kodak letter].
140. Id. at 1. The proposed rules would create ethical conflicts for patent attorneys.
141. See BIO letter, supra note 118. Limiting the number of IDS references effectively
undermines 37 C.F.R. § 1.97(h) (2007), which states that including a reference in an IDS does
not admit materiality.
142. For an analogous example, consider the lack of quality and forthrightness resulting
from the incentives structure in discovery processes. See, e.g., Stephan D. Easton, Can We
Talk?: Removing Counterproductive Ethical Restraints upon Ex Parte Communication Between
Attorneys and Adverse Expert Witnesses, 76 IND. L.J. 647, 671-73 (2001) ("While formal

discovery is one way to gather information... it has significant limitations. Chief among these
limitations is the involvement of the other attorney.... [T]he attorney will often do everything
she ethically can do to limit the amount of information that flows to her opponent."); Charles R.
Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litigation: The Needfor Vigorous Judicial
Action, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 793 (1991).

143. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2000).
144. See ABA letter, supra note 131, at 4.

145. See BIO letter, supra note 118, at 4-5.
146. See discussion supra Part I.B.

147. See BIO letter, supra note 118, at 6.
148. See AIPLA letter, supra note 2, at 5 ("The proposed 'safe harbor' does not provide any
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Furthermore, "the proposed safe harbor is an illusion"' 149 because, as the recent Federal
Circuit opinion in DigitalControl,Inc. v. CharlesMachine Works reiterated, courts are
bound by judicial precedent, not the PTO's administrative rules.' 5 0 Thus, there is no
guarantee that a court would even abide by the proposed safe harbor were it enacted.
Therefore, while the proposed rules might lighten the workload of the PTO, 151 there
is no such thing as a free lunch. There are harsh side effects to this approach.
Applicants will pay the costs and then some. Attempts to hide from the triggering
references will result in riskier strategic decision making and weaker patents. When
triggering references cannot be avoided, applicants will be forced to choose between
dishonesty, leading to allegations of inequitable conduct; or honesty, also inevitably
leading to allegations of inequitable conduct.
IIM. LESS NOVEL AND MORE OBVIOUS APPROACHES
Fortunately, all is not lost. Many of the critical problems have been foreseen by
forward-looking law firms, legal associations, companies, and individuals who have
written to inform the PTO. There have been several clever ideas suggested which
would meet the PTO's goals without the harsh costs associated with the proposed plan.
However, even if the proposed IDS rules are enacted by the PTO,the judiciary may
still be able to mitigate the damaging effects. As a last resort, practitioners can take
tactical steps to minimize the negative impacts. This Part suggests less drastic solutions
for the PTO, advice for the judiciary, and coping tips for practitioners, should the
proposed rules be enacted.
A. Suggestionsfor the PTO
Less procedural history would be created if the PTO would allow applicants to
employ European-style relevance ratings 152 to classify IDS references instead of longer
written "explanations."' 53 Applicants could simply rank and rate their information
using a number scale. While applicants would still be screening the IDS references and
admitting materiality, there would be less written paperwork that later litigation
opponents could use and there would be lower preparation costs required.
Another idea is to create a stronger "safe harbor" provision within 37 C.F.R. §
1.56.154 A stronger safe harbor would clearly and undisputedly spell out what
applicants would need to do to qualify for protection. However, even if the PTO were
safety not already accorded by court decisions.").
149. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
150. 437 F.3d 1309, 1314-16 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
151. See Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related
Materials, 71 Fed. Reg. 38,808, 38,809 (July 10, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
152. For example, relevance ratings of levels one to five, where one is the least "material to
patentability." Cf European Patent Office, Search Procedure, http://www.epo.org/aboutusljobslworking-at-the-epo/work-of-an-examiner/search.html (providing an example of a letterbased rating system).
153. See Amgen letter, supra note 118 (proposing European style number ratings for IDS
references).
154. Letter from Michael F. Morgan, Colgate-Palmolive Co., to John J.Doll, Comm'r for
Patents,
U.S.
Patent
& Trademark
Office
2
(Sept.
6,
2006)
(http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/ab95/colgatepalmolive.pdf)
[hereinafter Colgate letter].
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to provide such a provision, it would still need to be implemented by the judiciary. 155
Practitioners would want to be assured that there was a real benefit to be had for
compliance.
The strict twenty-reference threshold proposal needs revision. One helpful
suggestion for the PTO is to distinguish between electronically searchable documents
and other prior art. 156 With modem computer search and screening techniques,
electronically searchable documents would be less burdensome for the PTO to inspect.
Also, to reduce the harm of the twenty-reference triggering threshold, the PTO could
simply raise the threshold limit to a higher number. 157 Perhaps a threshold of forty or
fifty references would allow applicants to perform a thorough patentability search
without fear that they would inadvertently trigger the additional disclosure
requirements. Having a threshold, albeit a higher one, would still discourage
completely wasteful IDS filings, but would be less costly to knowledgeable applicants
and those in fields of art where relevant publications are plentiful.
Arguably the ideal solution would meet the PTO's efficiency and quality goals with
the minimal amount of change to the current, stable rules. This way, the harmful
ramifications mentioned158 and those that are unforeseen would be minimized. The
time necessary for the patenting community to adjust to the subtle changes would be
reduced with less novel and more obvious rules.
A better approach might be to ease into any new system. Perhaps small steps could
gradually be applied toward a system-wide transition. If it became apparent that the
new methods produced less than positive results, further adjustments or a change back
to the prior rules would not be as costly. For example, the PTO's approach was firstrate when it participated in the "Peer-to-Patent Project," where the Office cooperated
1 59
with small-scale tests of a new interpartesapproach to patent examination.

155. Cf Digital Control, Inc., 437 F.3d at 1309-20 (maintaining judicial discretion for
implementing C.F.R. rules).
156. See Microsoft letter, supra note 20, at 3 (proposing that the PTO distinguish between
different reference formats by noting the difference between electronically searchable and not).
157. See NYIPLA letter, supranote 75, at 5 (proposing that the twenty-reference triggering
condition be raised to at least fifty IDS references).
158. See supra Part II.

159. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE: 2007-2012 STRATEGIC PLAN 13 (2007),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2OO7/stratplan2OO7-2012.pdf ("[Iln
fiscal year 2006, the USPTO cooperated with a private sector-led group that chose to focus on
so-called 'peer review' as a possible means of improving the quality of patent application
packages received by the USPTO. Private sector-initiated and -led efforts may provide the
USPTO with important data and feedback that will help us, as stewards of the public trust,
improve patent, trademark, and other [intellectual property] systems for the benefit of all."); The
Peer to Patent Project: Community Patent Review, http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent; see
also The Peer to Patent Project,
Press
Release
August
29, 2006,
http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/pressrelease_082906.html.
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Instead of the PTO's Rube Goldberg1 60 approach, Ockham's razor' 61 should be
applied. One basic, yet effective, way to achieve the PTO's goals, presented by many
independently commenting parties, is to simply raise the rates. 162 Triggering references
could cost applicants additional fees to compensate examiners for the added burden of
inspection. Concepts such as prejudicial billing and variable rates are not new to the
Office. 163 Once the twenty-document threshold is crossed, applicants could pay for
each additional reference. Furthermore, triggering references over twenty-five pages in
length, documents in foreign languages, and documents submitted after the first IDS
period could each incurpro rata costs. This additional IDS filing fee system would be
analogous to the current policy with regard to the costs of different types and numbers
of patent claims.64 Additional monetary IDS filing costs would deter wasteful
submissions. But, if applicants wanted to err on the side of caution, they could opt to
pay additional examination fees.
A corollary idea, to keep the costs to applicants down, is that the PTO could give
applicants the choice of whether or not to have triggering references inspected. The
PTO could opt not to inspect every submitted IDS reference.' 65 Applicants could
separate their most important twenty for inspection and examiners could choose
whether or not to cover more. The presumption of validity166 would simply not extend
to the uninspected references. If issued patents listed all IDS references that were
submitted and distinguished between which references were and were not inspected,
then competitors to the patent holder could assume the burden of the additional
examinations. Materially significant, unexamined references would
also be available
67
for opposing parties to submit for reexaminations by the PTO. 1

160. Originally the name of a popular American cartoonist who drew hilarious sketches of
overly complicated inventions, "Rube Goldberg" appears in modem dictionaries as an adjective
describing devices "accomplishing by extremely complex roundabout means what actually or
seemingly could be done simply." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OFTHE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1983 (Philip B. Gove et al. eds., 1981) [hereinafter
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY]; see also The Official Website of Rube Goldberg, http://www.rubegoldberg.com (providing Rube Goldberg invention cartoon examples).
161. "[T]he philosophic rule that entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily."
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 160, at 1561. Or, as said another way, "all things being
equal, the simplest solution tends to be the best one."
162. Kodak letter, supranote 139, at 10 (proposing plan for applicants to pay an additional
fee for excess IDS documents and late IDS submissions); IBM letter, supra note 129, at 5
(proposing plan for applicants to pay a fee proportional to the amount of documents exceeding a
threshold number); cf 3M letter, supra note 124, at 4 (proposing an option for applicants to pay
more money for IDS documents over twenty or else follow the proposed requirements).
163. See, e.g., MANUAL, supra note 35, §§ 1.16, 608.01(i)(c) (fee differentiation). Monetary
costs for claims differ depending upon the number and type of claims above certain threshold
limits.
164. See BIO letter, supra note 118, at 10 (proposing an IDS document fee analogous to
current claim fees).
165. See ABA letter, supra note 131 (proposing to not require the PTO to consider every
cited IDS reference); cf MANUAL, supra note 35, § 609.

166. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2002).
167.- 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.510-1.570 (2000).
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B. Thoughtsfor the Judiciary

If the proposed rules are implemented, a second line of defense against the ill sideeffects would be wise jurisprudence. With regard to the PTO's administrative rules, the
judiciary has discretion. Both the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have already
demonstrated that they have the power to create doctrines' 68 and the ability to
disregard the C.F.R. rules of the patent system. 69 Furthermore, with implementation of
a new system of PTO rules, there would be a justifiable reason for courts to amend
their precedents and update the case law to create a new stability.
Changes to the IDS requirements are not fair unless they are accompanied by
corresponding changes in the doctrine of equitable conduct. 170 One solution to the
problems created by the proposed IDS rules would be for the judiciary to reduce the
scope of actions that would qualify for the first prong of the inequitable conduct test.
The requisite threshold levels of "materiality" and "intent" could be raised to reflect a
patent system where the PTO actively seeks to receive twenty or fewer documents on
an IDS. The intentionally deceptive culpability requirement could be raised to reflect
the Model Penal Code's definition of "purposeful."17 'Additionally, the judicial
balancing in the second prong of the inequitable conduct test could take into account
the change in burdens produced by any new IDS rules.
The judiciary could help patent applicants by developing a test to clearly identify
which references are "material to patentability" and "not cumulative." "Material to
patentability" for nonobviousness determinations could be presumed limited to
72
references that teach a minimum of at least two claim elements or limitations.1
"Cumulative" could be presumptively defined as any two references that teach the
same claimed elements. Any reference that teaches elements A, B, C would be
cumulative to any reference that teaches A, B, C, and D. With clear, judicially
supported standards, the uncertainty in the determination of which prior art would
necessarily be included in an IDS would dissipate.
A third judicial solution would be to increase the cost to defendants for making
unsubstantiated allegations of inequitable conduct-and disincentivize abuse of the
duty of candor's "stick."'' 73 For example, perhaps a defendant alleging inequitable
conduct would have to post a bond, similar to the requirement in corporate law
derivative suits, used to prevent allegations for nuisance settlements. 174Also, courts

168. For example, courts created the doctrine of inequitable conduct. See Precision
Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945) (setting forth the policy
justifications for the inequitable conduct doctrine); Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach.
Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining the history of the inequitable conduct
doctrine).
169. See Digital Control,Inc., 437 F.3d at 1316-20.
170. Amgen letter, supra note 118, at 3.
171. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (defining the various levels of culpability).
172. I recommend the number two because case law already holds that prior art teaching two
elements of a claim can be deemed material to patentability, despite the fact that the prior art
can not invalidate the patent alone. See Critikon Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access Inc.,
120 F.3d 1253, 1255-59 (Fed. Cir. 1997). This bar is low enough.
173. See supra notes 71-97 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 626, 627 (2003).
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could more actively discourage those who would present unsubstantiated or thinly
supported inequitable-conduct allegations by more stringently sanctioning attorneys
who recklessly misapply the doctrine.
C. Ideasfor Practitioners
If the proposed IDS rules are enacted by the PTO, it may take some time for the
judiciary to adjust. In the interim, it may be necessary for practitioners to be creativeto test the boundaries of the new rules.
IDS references can be tailored not to trigger. The proposed rules are triggered by
quantitative values of information that do not necessarily have a fixed format. The
concept of how much information fills precisely twenty-five pages is not clear. 75 As
many present-day students have discovered, concepts such as strict page limits are
antiquated. For example, through the miracle of the cut-and-paste feature in Microsoft
Word, the sentence "This is an experiment." was easily replicated over and over again.
One hundred pages of double-spaced, twelve-point text in the Times New Roman font
equated to just over thirty-five pages of the same text when single-spaced in ten-point
font. Today, scanning, cutting-and-pasting, and font shrinking can be easily and
effortlessly done.
Another loophole in the rules is that applicants may be able to publish their own
"conglomerate" prior art documents, composed of several smaller reference sources. 176
For example, it would not be too hard to literally combine twenty single-page
references into a combined document. The conglomerate document could then be
"published" on the Internet with each internal reference clearly citing its original
source and date of publication. The conglomerate document would make each of the
original, smaller sources "cumulative" and no longer needed to be individually listed in
the IDS. Theoretically, twenty conglomerate documents, each containing twenty-five
pages of shrunken, cut-and-pasted prior art references could literally allow an applicant
to submit the same information to the PTO as would be present in hundreds of
references and still not trigger the additional disclosure requirements.
Applicants should be careful to not overly exploit ambiguities in the rules by
excessively "tailoring" references. If formatting tactics are abused by applicants, it is
likely that the PTO will step in and provide stricter guidance. If the approach is grossly
abused, such that material information was intentionally hidden, then the result might
still be allegations of inequitable conduct, putting the enforceability of any resulting
patent in jeopardy.
Another approach practitioners could take to minimize the risks of inequitable
conduct would be to farm out patentability searches to specialty search firms.' 7
Applicants could specifically instruct the search firm to return a set number of
documents containing the most relevant prior art. However, the danger with this
approach might arise from the 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 rule that the duty to disclose applies to

175. See Colgate letter, supranote 154, at 3 (seeking PTO clarification with regard to what
exactly constitutes "twenty-five pages").
176. This idea stems from an interview with an Indianapolis patent attorney who shall
remain anonymous.
177. See, e.g., supra note 41 (the "Hawk").
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all "individuals associated with the filing or the prosecution.' ' 78 It is not clear whether
specialty patentability search firms would necessarily qualify. Disassociating the
separate search firm from the application might be possible if specific details of the
actual invention were not provided to the searcher.
If practitioners are forced to deal with the proposed IDS rules, they would be well
advised to develop consistent processes for dealing with patentability searches and
controlling triggering prior art references. The processes should be generally effective
in retrieving sufficient information for claim drafting and scope estimation, but also be
above reproach.
CONCLUSION

Information Disclosure Statements and the patent applicants' knowledge of prior art
are closely linked to the quality of patent drafting and any resulting patent's ability to
be successfully enforced in court. Current IDS practices are not working for the Patent
and Trademark Office. The PTO has proposed a novel set of IDS rule changes
intended to lighten the workload of the PTO. But, their costs would be extremely high.
The proposed rules are too untested and leave open too much potential for harmful side
effects to be trusted for implementation in all future U.S. patents.
Fortunately, the proposed rules can still be amended to minimize the harms created
for applicants. The PTO should aim to be less novel and more obvious in their
approach. Perhaps the best way to achieve the PTO's efficiency and quality goals
would be to take a simple approach. Give applicants the option to pay additional
examination fees in order to compensate the PTO for the added burden of "triggering"
references. While the judicially created inequitable conduct doctrine is a major source
of stress for those concerned with the future implementation of the proposed IDS rules,
it is the judiciary itself that can adjust the doctrine to compensate for any new burdens
to applicants. In the meantime, it will be up to patent practitioners' ingenuity to create
useful coping tactics to protect their clients and keep the U.S. patent system on track.

178. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(c) (2000).

